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Abstract
We consider the design and enactment of multi-
agent protocols that describe collaboration using
“normative” or “social” abstractions, specifically,
commitments. A (multiagent) protocol defines the
relevant social states and how they progress; each
participant maintains a local projection of these
states and acts accordingly. Protocols expose two
important challenges: (1) how to compose them in
a way that respects commitments and (2) how to
verify the compliance of the parties with the so-
cial states. Individually, these challenges are inad-
equately studied and together not at all.
We motivate the notion of a social context to cap-
ture how a protocol may be enacted. A protocol can
be verifiably enacted when its participants can de-
termine each other’s compliance. We first show the
negative result that even when protocols can be ver-
ifiably enacted in respective social contexts, their
composition cannot be verifiably enacted in the
composition of those social contexts. We next show
how to expand such a protocol so that it can be
verifiably enacted. Our approach involves design
rules to specify composite protocols so they would
be verifiably enactable. Our approach demonstrates
a use of dialectical commitments, which have pre-
viously been overlooked in the protocols literature.
1 Introduction
How can we address the problem of achieving secure collab-
oration? Secure collaboration relies upon an effective means
for capturing the standards of correct interaction between au-
tonomous parties and for providing an effective basis for de-
ciding if those standards are met [Singh, 2013]. Accordingly,
we take as our point of departure extensive previous work
on multiagent protocols specifying interactions between au-
tonomous principals (humans or organizations) facilitated by
their computational agents. Singh [2013] proposes that the
standards alluded to above can be effectively represented via
directed normative relationships capturing who is account-
able to whom for what and when.
Of the possible such normative relationships, the concept
of (social) commitments has received the most attention in
connection with protocols. Specifically, we consider com-
mitment protocols [Yolum and Singh, 2002] where the social
state of an interaction is expressed using commitments and
the actions of a protocol in terms of how they affect com-
mitments. In particular, Cp(x, y, r, u) means a commitment
from a debtor x to a creditor y that if the antecedent r holds,
then the consequent u will hold [Singh, 2008]. The social
state is a notional state of an ongoing interaction. Each agent
acts based on its local projection of that state using which it
takes its decisions on how to proceed.
We focus on one important correctness criterion for in-
teractions, namely, compliance with respect to the above-
mentioned standards of interaction. Achieving and judging
compliance is essential to realizing secure collaboration. An
agent is compliant if and only if it discharges all commit-
ments of which it is the debtor [Venkatraman and Singh,
1999]. We are not interested directly in whether an agent
participating in a protocol is compliant, because that is de-
pendent upon the agent’s internal decision making. Instead,
we consider whether a protocol itself is such that, when en-
acted, it supports each participant verifying the compliance of
the other participants.
For verification, a creditor of a commitment must be able
to observe relevant events so it can determine the outcome of
the commitment. The relevant events include operations on
commitments (such as create or cancel) and events whose oc-
currence affects the truth or falsity of the commitment’s an-
tecedent or consequent. When a commitment is minimally
expressed, those events are precisely the atoms in the an-
tecedent or consequent. Compliant behavior by a debtor pre-
sumes the debtor can observe the same events, otherwise they
may be unaware of their engagements. For this reason, veri-
fiability of compliance ought to incorporate considerations of
alignment [Chopra and Singh, 2015b].
Loosely inspired by human interactions, we introduce the
idea of a social context. A (social) context corresponds to a
possible transaction whose constituent events the participants
in the context can observe. We formally define the verifia-
bility of a protocol with respect to a context. Roughly, an
enactment of a multiagent system is any sequence of events
in which the members of the system participate. An agent can
determine whether a commitment enters a particular state if it
can compute this state exclusively from the events it can ob-
serve. Then, a protocol is verifiable in a context if and only if
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for any enactment that takes place in the context, if an agent
determines that a commitment mentioned in the protocol is
created of which it is the creditor, then that agent can deter-
mine if the commitment was discharged, expired, or violated.
Original Contributions We make the following contribu-
tions. (1) A characterization of protocol enactment in social
contexts. (2) An approach to determine if a protocol is ver-
ifiable with respect to a social context. We show that, im-
portantly, a composite protocol need not be verifiable in the
union of contexts in which its constituent protocols are ver-
ifiable. (3) A way to bridge social contexts via dialectical
commitments. (4) An extensible set of pragmatic rules with
which to produce verifiable composite protocols.
Organization Section 2 discusses observability of events
related to compliance and verifiability. Section 3 sets up
our approach, introducing protocol enactments and explain-
ing how to bridge enactments by way of dialectical commit-
ments and social recognition. Section 4 concludes this paper
with a discussion of the literature and some future directions.
2 Compliance and Verifiability
We explain the impact of event observability on commitments
with the help of two simple scenarios.
Example 1 (Purchase at shop) Consider a commitment ma-
de by a shopkeeper toward a client to give the client the goods
she paid for. Payment at the cash register creates in the client
the expectation to receive the goods. Moreover, cash and
goods passing at the counter are events that can be observed
by all of the parties involved. Consequently, the interaction
between the client and the shopkeeper makes the commitment
between the two progress for both of them.
Since all relevant events can be observed by all principals,
each principal knows which commitments are active (or ex-
pired, detached, or violated). Each principal knows about its
own and the other principal’s compliance. We say that the two
principals enact an interaction that is verifiable. However, it
is not always the case that all concerned parties observe all of
the events relevant to their commitments.
Example 2 (Delivery at home) Suppose delivery is made by
a courier. Thus, it is not directly observable by the shop-
keeper. The shopkeeper’s commitment for delivery of goods
is satisfied as soon as the courier completes the delivery. The
client will see such a commitment as satisfied and will know
the shopkeeper to be compliant. The shopkeeper cannot ob-
serve this event and will not be able to do the same.
This case exhibits two social contexts: one that involves
only the courier and the client, and one that involves the shop-
keeper, client, and courier. Delivery belongs to the first con-
text, not to the second, where its occurrence is therefore not
verifiable. The problem arises because we would like an event
from the former context to have an impact on the other. The
principals’ views of the state of the interaction cannot there-
fore be “aligned” [Chopra and Singh, 2015b], hence yielding
nonverifiability.
Situations such as the above occur normally in the real
world. Therefore, a key challenge is how to make information
about events from one context available to another where that
information is socially relevant. In the real world, similar sit-
uations are often tackled by introducing actions (like delivery
tracking), whose meaning is a claim about a state of affairs
(a position). Such claims imply the taking of responsibility of
the truth of what is declared; for instance, the courier declares
the state of delivery through the tracking service. They con-
cern events that are relevant to social aims, and that are not
directly observable by all of the involved parties—as in the
case of the shopkeeper. In other words, these claims act as
“bridges” between different contexts. The courier’s statement
about the delivery makes information about an event that be-
longs to the context involving the courier and client available
to the context involving the shopkeeper.
The commitments correspond to expectations by some
principals of others, and each principal is accountable for the
expectations it creates in others. For this reason, we represent
the above-mentioned claims as dialectical commitments: A
dialectical commitment Cd(x, y, r, p) means that x (creditor)
commits to y (debtor) to the truth of consequent p, provided
the antecedent r holds. Practical and dialectical commitments
have different normative natures. Practical commitments are
most useful in settings where we expect the debtor to possess
the requisite capabilities and powers (including of persuad-
ing others to exercise the requisite capabilities). Dialectical
commitments are most useful where we expect the debtor to
possess the relevant knowledge or be able to obtain it. By re-
alizing claims as commitments, debtors become accountable
for their declarations, and are held liable when the commit-
ment is violated. We use C(. . .) when it is not necessary to
distinguish between the two kinds of commitment.
In our proposal, the shopkeeper and courier rely on a prag-
matic rule specific to their microsociety because of which
they can use dialectical commitments as equal to the condi-
tions they concern. This is just one example of a pragmatic
rule. Pragmatic rules are characteristic of the specific social
contexts. Thus, the key challenge to interoperation that we
tackle is how to determine how the practical commitments
progress when some relevant events are not observable in the
context. To this end:
1. we use dialectical commitments as claims concerning
the occurrence of events in other contexts;
2. we define pragmatic rules that the agents of a con-
text may share: such rules exploit the normative value
of dialectical commitments and enable commitments to
progress even based on events that are not directly ob-
servable.
Our approach addresses the composition of verifiable in-
teraction protocols: whether the participants in an interaction
can verify their own compliance and that of their interlocu-
tors with respect to a social context in which the protocol is
executed. Our problem differs from and complements ex-
isting works on formal approaches for protocols. Existing
approaches do not consider the context of enactment. Re-
search on monitoring ongoing interactions, e.g., [Chesani et
al., 2013], concerns only a given execution trace and often
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requires a centralized approach or a shared monitor. Oth-
ers, e.g., [Dastani et al., 2004], consider the agents that en-
act protocol roles, whereas we consider the enactment of a
protocol (as a whole) inside a context. Chopra and Singh’s
[2015b] approach specifies the messages the debtor and cred-
itor must send to each other to ensure their alignment, but do
not analyze protocols as such. Others, e.g., [El-Menshawy
et al., 2010; Astefanoaei, 2011; Lomuscio et al., 2012;
El-Menshawy et al., 2013; Gerard and Singh, 2013] specify
formal models of protocols (or protocol or service compo-
sitions) and verify using model checkers such as MCMAS.
They consider protocol properties such as conformance, ter-
mination, and refinement but not verifiability, which is what
we study here.
3 Verifiability of Protocol Enactments
A commitment is directed from a debtor to a creditor and in-
volves an antecedent and a consequent [Singh, 2008]. The
directionality of commitments is crucial for establishing ac-
countability. Additionally, this directionality provides a ba-
sis for tackling the challenges of compliance and verifiability.
We enhance Marengo et al.’s [2011] formalization to incor-
porate dialectical commitments formed over temporal expres-
sions in precedence logic [Singh, 2003]. This logic has three
primary operators: ‘∨’ (choice), ‘∧’ (concurrence), and ‘·’
(before). The before operator enables one to express condi-
tions such as pay · deliver : both pay and deliver must occur
and in the specified order. The specifications are interpreted
over runs. Each run τ is a sequence of events. For simplic-
ity, the events can be thought of as propositional but can be
generated schematically as in pay$1, pay$2, . . .
Let e be an event. Then e, the complement of e, is also
an event. Initially, neither e nor e hold. On any run, either
e or e may occur, not both. Moreover, we extend comple-
mentation to expressions in general. Given temporal expres-
sions p and q, (i) p ∧ q = p ∨ q. (ii) p ∨ q = p ∧ q. (iii)
p · q = p ∨ q ∨ (q · p). We assume that events are nonre-
peating. In practice, transaction IDs or timestamps differenti-
ate multiple instances of the same event type. Commitments
are manipulated by the operations create (an agent creates a
commitment toward someone), cancel (a debtor withdraws
its commitment), release (an agent withdraws a commitment
of which it is the creditor), assign (a new creditor is speci-
fied by the previous one), delegate (a new debtor is specified
by the previous one), discharge (the commitment is resolved)
[Yolum and Singh, 2002]. Figure 1 shows the commitment
life cycle [Telang et al., 2011].
A commitment is Violated when its antecedent is true but
its consequent will forever be false, or it is canceled when
Detached (in informal terms, the debtor is liable for the vi-
olation); Satisfied, meaning that the engagement is accom-
plished; Expired, meaning that it is no longer in effect and
therefore the debtor would not fail to comply even if does not
accomplish the consequent; Typically, a commitment should
be Active when it is initially created: Conditional if its an-
tecedent is not true and Detached if its antecedent is true. Ac-
tive has two substates: Conditional (as long as the antecedent
does not occur) and Detached (the antecedent has occurred).
Conditional Detached
Expired Satisfied Violated
Active
antecedent fail
antecedent
consequent failconsequent
Figure 1: Commitment life cycle.
Our semantics introduces the elements necessary for the in-
terpretation of dialectical commitments. Briefly, the seman-
tics is given in terms of a model,M = 〈E, T,Cp,Dp,Xp,Vp,
Cd, Dd, Xd, Vd〉. E is a denumerable set of possible events;
T is the set of possible event runs. Cp and Cd are the model
standards for (active) commitments. That is, at each index
on each run, for each debtor-creditor (ordered) pair of agents,
Cp (Cd) assigns to a set of runs a set of sets of runs. The in-
tuition is that the model determines which conditional com-
mitment is active from a debtor to a creditor at an index in a
run. Dp,Xp,Vp are respectively the standards for discharged,
expired, and violated practical commitments. And, similarly
Dd,Xd,Vd for dialectical commitments. We assume seman-
tic postulates 1–8 from [Marengo et al., 2011]. [[q]] is the
intension of q, that is, the set of runs where it is true on in-
dex 0: [[q]] = {τ | τ |=0 q}. And, τi,j] refers to projection
of τ from index i to j, both inclusive. We add the following
semantic postulate to accommodate dialectical commitments:
τ |=i Cd(x, y, r, q) iff [[q]] ∈ Cdx,y(τ, i, [[r]]).
Intuitively, a dialectical commitment is active at index i of
run τ iff the intension of its consequent condition q belongs
to the set of sets returned by Cdx,y(τ, i, [[r]]). For operations,
we define the following semantic postulates:
τ |=i Create(C(x, y, r, u)) iff
τ 6|=i C(x, y, r, u) and τ |=i+1 C(x, y, r, u)
τ |=i Discharge(C(x, y, r, u)) iff
τ |=i C(x, y, r, u) and τ |=[0,i+1] u
τ |=i Expire(C(x, y, r, u)) iff
τ |=i C(x, y, r, u) and τ[0,i+1] |= r
τ |=i V iolate(C(x, y, r, u)) iff
τ |=i C(x, y, r, u) and τ |=[0,i+1] u
τ |=i Detach(C(x, y, r, u)) iff
τ |=i C(x, y, r, u) and τ |=[0,i+1] r
Commitments persist until they are discharged, expired, vi-
olated. When this happens, the corresponding commitment
no longer holds (and never holds again). We adopt the notion
of residuation [Marengo et al., 2011; Singh, 2003] to track
progress in the real world. The residual q/e of a condition
q with respect to an event e is the remainder condition that
would be left over after the event occurs, and whose satisfac-
tion would guarantee the satisfaction of the original condi-
tion. Residuation helps compute commitment progress given
an event occurrence. Below, when c = C(x, y, r, u), c/e de-
notes C(x, y, r/e, u/e). A commitment can progress toward
its residual with respect to an event (its antecedent and conse-
quent are residuated), or it can expire, be violated, or be dis-
charged. This is captured by the following theorem [Marengo
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et al., 2011], which shows how a commitment (either practi-
cal or dialectical) progresses.
Below, following [Singh, 2003], > means the temporal ex-
pression satisfied by every run and 0 an expression that is
satisfied by no run.
Theorem 1 If τ |=i C(x, y, r, u) and τi+1 = e, then
τ |=i+1Expire(C(x, y, r, u)) if r/e .= 0
V iolate(C(x, y, r, u)) if r/e .= >, u/e .= 0
Discharge(C(x, y, r, u)) if u/e .= >
Detach(C(x, y, r, u)) if r/e .= >
C(x, y, r/e, u/e) otherwise
3.1 Protocol enactments
Below, a principal refers to an active social entity such as a
person. Let P be a nonempty, finite set of principals. Let B
be a nonempty set of events. Let E be the set of event tem-
poral expressions generated from B. Let C = {C(x, y, r, u) :
x, y ∈ P and r, u ∈ E}, be the set of possible commitments.
Let S be the set of possible operations on commitments. Let
A = B ∪ S be a set of events. A (social) context relates prin-
cipals with the events they observe in the context. Intuitively,
C is the set of commitment specifications for the context.
Definition 1 A context is a tuple X = 〈α,C,P〉 where α is
a set of events in A and C ⊆ C is a set of commitments (over
P and E), and P is a set of principals. A context is nonempty
when α 6= ∅, and P 6= ∅. Given an event f , the progression
of X under f is a context X/f = 〈α, {c/f : c ∈ C}〉. Given
two contexts, X = 〈α,C,P〉 and X ′ = 〈α′, C ′,P ′〉, their
union is the context X ∪X ′ = 〈α ∪ α′, C ∪ C ′,P ∪ P ′〉.
Definition 2 Let X = 〈α,C,P〉 be a context. For an event
a ∈ A, the observers of a in X , obs(a) ⊆ P , is a set of
principals who can observe the occurrence a.
Definition 3 An event e ∈ E is relevant to a commitment
C(x, y, r, u) ∈ C iff one of the following holds: r/e 6≡ r,
r/e 6≡ r, u/e 6≡ u, or , u/e 6≡ u.
Intuitively, Definition 3 states that e is relevant to C(x, y,
r, u) when e is involved either in r or u. That is, e is signif-
icant in the expiration, violation, discharge, detachment, or
progression of the commitment. Clearly, event observability
determines the observability of commitment operations, e.g.,
the observability of a commitment creation is determined by
the observability of the message that brings about its creation,
and the observability of a detach is determined by the one of
the events that are relevant to its antecedent.
An atomic protocol involves two roles (sender and re-
ceiver), a single message between them, and a set of commit-
ments. The message meaning is its effect on some commit-
ment. For example, a payment is an atomic protocol as is the
physical delivery of an item by a courier to a recipient. The
social events corresponding to a physical event occur concur-
rently with the physical event [Goldman, 1970].
A protocol involves two or more roles and describes what
protocols those roles participate in, and a set of commit-
ments. For example, the purchase protocol describes how
a customer, merchant, and courier interact to carry out their
business transaction and can be built as the composition of
three pair-wise protocols.
Definition 4 A protocol is a triple 〈R,M, I〉, where R is a
set of roles, M is a set of messages, and I is a set of com-
mitments (that hold at the beginning of the interaction). An
atomic protocol is a protocol where M is a singleton. Be-
low, the suffix k can either be p or d, to specify the kind of
commitment on which operations are applied.
PROTOCOL −→ axiom{ , axiom }
axiom −→ 〈〈message { means social { , social} }〉〉
social −→ op(R,R, condition, condition)
op −→ Createk | Cancelk | Releasek | Assignk |Delegatek
condition −→ tempcond { ∧ tempcond }
tempcond −→ sequence { ∨ sequence }
sequence −→ 0 | > | elem | elem · elem
elem −→ message | C k (R,R, condition, condition)
R yields role names (a role is a placeholder for a principal
who will enact the protocol), message yields physical events
and social is an operation on commitments. We assume that
every physical event has a corresponding social event, that
for simplicity we assume having the same name. Below, we
denote by MP and CP respectively the set of social events
and of commitments that can possibly be generated during a
protocol enactment.
Definition 5 Let P = 〈R,M, I〉 be a protocol and let X =
〈α,C,P〉 be a context. X enacts P iff for all r ∈ R there is a
principal p ∈ P that plays the role r,MP ⊆ α, CP ⊆ C, and
I ⊆ C. We denote the enactment of P by X as P . X . An
event a ∈ A arises in an enactment iff there is a p ∈ P that
plays a role r ∈ R that can make action a occur. We denote
by P † R the set of principals that play protocol P ′s roles in
the enactment.
Definition 6 An enactment E = P . X is social iff for every
a ∈ A that arises in E, obs(a) ⊇ P †R.
Definition 7 states that in a closed enactment, for any rel-
evant event, there is at least one principal from the context
who can make it occur.
Definition 7 An enactment P . X is closed iff for every com-
mitment c ∈ CP , every event a ∈ A that is relevant to c arises
in P . X . A context that is not closed is open.
Proposition 1 (Stability of Closure under Progress) Let E
be a closed social enactment. Let f be an event. Then E/f is
a closed social enactment.
Proof. From induction over the structure of formulas. 
Definition 8 Let P . X be an enactment. Then P is strictly
verifiable inX iff the detach and discharge events of any com-
mitment in CP can be observed in X .
Clearly, a closed and social enactment is strictly verifiable but
in all other cases strict verifiability does not necessarily hold
because some relevant events may not be observable (or at
least not be observable by the debtor and the creditor). Strict
verifiability is too strong a condition: It generally works only
for protocols being enacted in a monolithic context. For ex-
ample, in a purchase protocol where the merchant commits to
the customer but it is a courier who makes the delivery, strict
13
verifiability would hold only for contexts where the merchant
is present to see the delivery done. In general, ensuring the
merchant’s presence is impractical—the courier is often hired
because the merchant can’t make the delivery directly.
Indeed, it is reasonable to think of real-world enactments
as composable: that is, an enactment is generally the com-
position of simpler enactments where simpler protocols are
executed in possibly different contexts. The aim of enact-
ment composition is to create closed enactments, where all
the relevant events arise.
Definition 9 Given two enactments E = P . X and E′ =
P ′ . X ′, where P = 〈R,M, I〉, P ′ = 〈R′,M ′, I ′〉, X =
〈α,C,P〉, and X ′ = 〈α′, C ′,P ′〉, the composition E  E′ =
Q . Z, where Q = 〈R ∪ R′,M ∪M ′, I ∪ I ′〉 and Z is the
context 〈α ∪ α′, C ∪ C ′,P ∪ P ′〉.
Interestingly, while the composition of a set of closed enact-
ments is a closed enactment, the composition of social en-
actments is not necessarily social. The property depends on
the observability of events which does not necessarily extend
to the whole set of principals playing roles in the composed
protocol. Conversely, the composition of a nonsocial enact-
ment with other enactments yields a nonsocial enactment be-
cause composition does not modify the set of observers of
an event. In such a situation, however, principals may not
remain aligned in their views of commitments and of the pro-
gression of these commitments due to the partial observability
of events.
Example 3 Consider purchase at shop, involving a shop-
keeper and client, as explained in Example 1. We capture
this as a context X , where P = {shopkeeper, client}; α ⊇
{pay, give, offer}, where pay, give and offer are observ-
able by both principals, C = {C(shopkeeper, client, pay,
give)}. Let PAY be the atomic protocol 〈{buyer, seller},
{pay}, ∅〉 and suppose that shopkeeper and client respec-
tively play the roles seller and buyer. Let GIVE be the atomic
protocol 〈{buyer, seller}, {give}, {Cp(seller, buyer, pay,
give)}〉.
PAY . X is a closed, social enactment. PAY ◦ GIVE . X is
a composite enactment that realizes a purchase. It is a closed,
social (thus, strictly verifiable) enactment.
Example 4 Let OFFER be the protocol 〈{buyer, seller},
{offer means create(Cp(seller, buyer, pay, deliver))},
∅〉. When deliver does not arise in the context (e.g. delivery
at home is not performed directly by the seller), OFFER . X
is an open but social enactment.
Let DELIVER be the atomic protocol 〈{buyer, courier},
{deliver}, ∅〉, and Y be a context, where P = {client,
courier}; α ⊇ {deliver}, deliver is observable by client
and courier, and C = ∅. DELIVER . Y is a closed, social
enactment.
PAY ∪ OFFER ∪ DELIVER . X ∪ Y is a closed, nonsocial
enactment where the discharge of the commitment created by
offer cannot be observed by shopkeeper because he does not
observe deliver. Strict verifiability does not hold. However,
if courier is trusted, shopkeeper could accept a claim by
courier that delivery occurred.
A proposition is acceptable to an agent in an enactment if
and only if it can support the proposition by direct observation
or by a dialectical commitment from a trusted party.
Definition 10 Let P . X be an enactment. Then P is weakly
verifiable in X iff for each commitment in CP , whose detach
and discharge belong to the set of events α from X , its credi-
tor accepts discharge and its debtor accepts detach.
All strictly verifiable enactments are weakly verifiable.
Now we come to the main negative result of this paper.
In general, strict verifiability is not preserved by enactment
composition: even in the case in which one composes two
closed, social (and, thus, strictly verifiable) enactments, the
resulting enactment is not necessarily social (as observed
above). Thus, the observability of detach and discharge is
not granted. Weak verifiability substitutes direct observability
with the creation (and progress) of dialectical commitments.
Similarly to the previous case, weak verifiability is not pre-
served by enactment composition. Again, event observability
is not granted in the composed enactment.
Proposition 2 (Verifiability under Composition) There ex-
ist protocols P , P ′ and contexts X , X ′ such that P is weakly
verifiable in X and P ′ is weakly verifiable in X ′, yet P ∪ P ′
is not weakly verifiable in X ∪X ′.
Consider the composed enactment E  E′ where E and E′
are weakly verifiable, and their sets of events α and α′ are
disjoint. Suppose events a, b, c arise in E: a is observed only
by x; b creates Cp(x, z,>, a); c creates Cd(x, z,>, a). Sup-
pose E′ is an open enactment because there is an event that
creates C1 = Cp(x′, z′, a, d), but a does not belong to E′.
Then, in E  E′ the principals playing z and z′ are different
and, by construction, neither of the principals playing x′ and
z′ can observe a or c. Then, z′ cannot observe C1 detach but
this yields that E  E′ is not weakly verifiable. 
Proposition 2 shows that it is possible to create composite
protocols that are not verifiable even though their constituent
protocols are. We could require a monolithic context, but that
would be counterproductive. Instead, we provide a way to de-
velop new protocols that relies upon pragmatic rules and upon
the addition of new messages that create dialectical commit-
ments. Each pragmatic rule (Section 3.2) is a way to compose
protocols. Potentially, each pragmatic rule imposes distinct
conditions on contexts to ensure weak verifiability.
3.2 Bridging Enactments by Pragmatic Rules
We now show how an enactment that is not weakly verifiable
can be turned into one that is weakly verifiable: here, dialecti-
cal commitments are used as claims that support the progress
of practical commitments with respect to events that are not
observable. Based on the above, we can relax the notion of
satisfaction of a commitment to the following: that its credi-
tor accepts that it is discharged (independent of whether it is
in fact discharged). A good protocol would make sure that,
for any commitment, the creditor can determine whether the
debtor discharges it. In the present setting, we relax this re-
quirement to the creditor accepting that the commitment is
discharged.
To realize this view we introduce pragmatic rules: patterns
of pragmatic reasoning that principals may or may not adopt
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in an enactment. Adopting a pragmatic rule means that all
principals in the context share the rule. Specifically, we use
pragmatic rules to capture the interplay between practical and
dialectical commitments. We present the pragmatic rules ex-
tending the operational semantics in [Telang et al., 2011] with
dialectical commitments. The configuration of an agent x is
Sx = 〈B,G, C〉 where B is its set of beliefs about the cur-
rent snapshot of the world, and C its set of commitments. G
is x’s set of goals: it is not used in the following. The oper-
ational semantics is given via guarded rules in which the Si
are configurations and S1 −→ S2 is a transition:
guard
S1 −→ S2.
In most settings, it is possible to specify a family of tran-
sitions as an action. For example, for a commitment C,
suspend(C) refers to the set of transitions Si −→ Sj where
C ∈ Si.C (the set of commitments of configuration Si) and
suspend(C) ∈ Sj .C. For actions a and b, a∧ b indicates that
both must be performed. The same guard may enable multi-
ple transitions Si −→ Sj with the same Si, indicating choice
of the agent involved.
Algorithm 1 Enactment Closure under Claim
Require: E = P . X is an enactment; X = 〈α,C,P〉; P =
〈R,M, I〉
Require: A′ is the set of events a′, each of which is relevant to
some practical commitment c ∈ CP , and for each of which
∃p′ ∈ P †R and p′ 6∈ obs(a′)
Require: for any a′ ∈ A′, there is at least one p ∈ P such that
p ∈ obs(a′)
1: function CLOSURE(X = 〈α,C,P〉, P = 〈R,M, I〉, A′)
2: α′ ← α; C′ ← C; M ′ ←M ;
3: for all a′ ∈ A′ do
4: x← one of p ∈ P , such that p ∈ obs(a′)
5: Y ← P †R− obs(a′)
6: M ′ ←M ′∪
7: {claima′ means Create(Cd(x, Y,>, a′))}
8: α′ ← α′ ∪ {Create(Cd(x, Y,>, a′)), . . .}
9: C′ ← C′ ∪ {Cd(x, Y,>, a′)}
10: obs(claima′)← P †R
11: end for
12: X ′ ← 〈α′, C′,P〉; P ′ ← 〈R,M ′, I〉
13: return P ′ . X ′
14: end function
Structural rules Telang et al. [2011] specify the progres-
sion of a commitment. Their guards are events that occur in
the social state and are observed by the agent. We extend such
rules to manage residuation because in our setting, the occur-
rence of events makes commitments progress via residuation:
Bx |= t
C(x, y, r, q) −→ C(x, y, r/t, q/t)
We now introduce the pragmatic rule Social Recognition
that enables considering dialectical commitments to events as
sufficient claims that can be used to progress commitments.
Cd(w, z,>, t)
Cp(x, y, r, q) −→ Cp(x, y, r/t, q/t) SR
The intent is detaching or discharging practical commit-
ments based upon the creation of appropriate dialectical com-
mitments; alternatively, causing the violation or expiration of
practical commitments in presence of appropriate dialectical
commitments. For instance, the shopkeeper cannot physically
observe the delivery of goods by the courier but since the
shopkeeper trusts the courier, he accepts a dialectical com-
mitment from the latter that the goods were delivered. To
exploit the pragmatic rule SR, we require that:
τ |=i Cd(w, z,>, t) ∧ τ |=i Cp(x, y, r, u)⇒
τ |=i+1 Cp(x, y, r/t, u/t)
(R1)
To make an enactment weakly verifiable it is necessary to
(1) close the enactment by composing the enactment with fur-
ther enactments where relevant events, that do not arise in the
first enactment, can occur; (2) make the enactment social via
dialectical commitments, so that SR can be applied to sup-
port commitment progression. Given a closed, nonsocial en-
actment E = P . X , Algorithm 1 creates an enactment that
extends it, and that is weakly verifiable.
Proposition 3 (Weak verifiability under Claim)
Consider a closed, nonsocial enactment E = P . X , where
X = 〈α,C,P〉 and P = 〈R,M, I〉, such that: (1) for any
relevant event that does not arise in E, some principal in P †
R observes it; (2) each p ∈ P † R adopt Social Recognition.
The enactment E′ = P ′ . X ′ that is produced by applying
Algorithm 1 to E is weakly verifiable.
Proof. Suppose that there is a commitment c ∈ CP ′ and a
pair of principals p′, p′′ ∈ P ′, such that c is discharged for
p but not for p′. Then, there must be an event ak in the run
that is observed by p but not by p′. However, either ak arises
in P . X and is observable by all principals (by our hypoth-
esis since the enactment is social), or it is a “claim” event,
added by Algorithm 1, and which means the creation of a di-
alectical commitment. The event is observed by all principals
by construction. SR makes the commitments progress in the
same way for both p and p′, so the hypothesis is absurd. And,
analogously for the other commitment state changes. 
When the initial enactment is not closed, Algorithm 1 com-
pletes it by introducing the means for the principals to claim
the occurrence of only part of the relevant events that cannot
be observed. In order to tackle those events that do not arise
in the enactment it is necessary to compose the enactment
with others where such events arise. It is possible to make an
enactment closed and social by iteratively alternating com-
position and Algorithm 1. A dialectical commitment bridges
two enactments: one in which the event occurs and another
in which the event is socially relevant but where it does not
arise.
Example 5 Example 4 introduces the closed, non social en-
actment PAY ∪ OFFER ∪ DELIVER . X ∪ Y , deliver cannot
be observed by shopkeeper. Algorithm 1 makes it weakly
verifiable by adding the protocol action claimdeliver means
Create(Cd(courier, shopkeeper,>, deliver)) using which
courier can state that delivery occurred, taking liability
for the truth of its claim. The commitment Cd(courier,
shopkeeper, >, deliver) is added to the set of all possible
commitments of the context.
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This leads us to Theorem 2 on commitment progression.
The proof is simple by construction. The theorem shows
that practical commitments progress when adopting Social
Recognition and considering dialectical commitments as evi-
dence of event occurrence.
Theorem 2 Given a weakly verifiable enactment P . X , and
assuming requirement (R1), if τ |=i C(x, y, r, u) and τi = e,
then:
τ |=i+1Expire(C(x, y, r/e, u/e)) if r/e .= 0
V iolate(C(x, y, r/e, u/e)) if r/e .= >,
u/e
.
= 0
Discharge(C(x, y, r/e, u/e)) if u/e .= >
Detach(C(x, y, r/e, u/e)) if r/e .= >
C(x, y, r/e, u/e) otherwise
4 Conclusions
A proper treatment of the challenges of secure collaboration
and governance requires that we model sociotechnical sys-
tems [Singh, 2013; Sommerville, 2010] in formal terms. Cru-
cial to such systems is the incorporation of a societal perspec-
tive. It helps to understand sociotechnical systems as per-
forming a social computation, taken as the sum of the inde-
pendent contributions of autonomous and heterogeneous par-
ties [Singh, 2014; Baldoni et al., 2014].
Our approach addresses the challenges of passing to a soci-
etal perspective by studying the impact of event observability
on commitments and by supplying a notion of progression of
commitments that relies upon dialectical commitments, and
on the interplay between these and practical commitments,
captured through a pragmatic rule. To the best of our knowl-
edge, the notion of observability is original to this paper.
Although we emphasize just one pragmatic rule in this pa-
per, social recognition, other such rules could be defined. It
would be interesting to study others as well as their joint use,
in order, e.g., to turn practical commitments into dialectical
ones, or to create dialectical commitments based on dialecti-
cal commitments by other agents.
Our approach provides a valuable tool for cross-organi-
zational process modeling, and it would be interesting to
combine it with design methodologies where the specifica-
tion of commitment-based protocols and of their composi-
tion is fundamental, like Amoeba [Desai et al., 2009] and
the 2CL Methodology [Baldoni et al., 2014]. In the former,
for instance, a real-life insurance claim processing case is
analyzed, which involves a number of principals (insurance
company, call center, mechanic, claim handler). Once the in-
dividual protocols are identified, they are composed into an
overall process, which may still be modified if some changes
occur, e.g. as in the case of subcontracting or of outsourcing.
Clearly, observability and weak verifiability play a fundamen-
tal role in this kind of application.
Currently, dialectical commitments are used in formal dia-
log systems, dialog games, and argumentation, e.g., [McBur-
ney and Parsons, 2002; Norman et al., 2004; Chaib-draa et
al., 2006; Wells and Reed, 2005; Singh, 2008]. In contrast
to such works, we adopt a conception wherein the connec-
tion to real world is key and introduce an indirection from
objective reality to a commitment by an agent about the real-
ity; further, we enable principals to commit both dialectically
and practically, and exploit dialectical commitments to sup-
port practical ones.
Our approach opens the way to the study of protocols based
on normative relationships that are modular and composable.
In this respect, we claim that social contexts provide abstrac-
tion spaces: each social context potentially involves its own
vocabulary of interaction that defines the facts and actions of
relevance to the context. That is, the heart of a social con-
text lies not in the specific principals who participate in it but
in the interpretation of their interactions. We mean to study
relationships between contexts, e.g., that a context observes
another context or that an event in one context counts as an-
other event in a different context, as well as how contexts can
be composed into more complex contexts.
Our approach and its possible future advancements bear
interesting implications in the development of electronic in-
stitutions [Arcos et al., 2007; Esteva et al., 2004; Fornara et
al., 2008]. We provide a unified framework for reasoning
about violations, be they captured by practical or by dialec-
tical commitments. One development that we mean to pur-
sue is to introduce a first-order representation of commitment
conditions and to allow commitment conditions to progress in
the presence of incomplete information based on works such
as [Montali et al., 2014]. A related direction of future work
involves modeling explicit deadlines [Chesani et al., 2009;
Chopra and Singh, 2015a]. Deadlines would be useful to
identify classes of violations (and the liable parties) in real-
world applications. We will also study the relations between
dialectical commitments, reputation, and trust. Another fu-
ture development is to study whether the notion of align-
ment due to information propagation in [Chopra and Singh,
2015b], and the notion of alignment due to nonuniform ob-
servability, as presented in this paper, can be unified into a
single framework.
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